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 China’s water quality, quantity, and environmental management issues and policies were 
analyzed through three lenses: environmental policy through regulations, policies and projects to 
increase water quantity, and water quality treatment and distribution methods pursued. Three issues, 
rather than one, were focused upon in order to enable a more holistic understanding of the political 
climate and the policy mechanisms employed by the Chinese government.  
Concerning environmental regulations, current state of the art, as well as implementation issues 
were studied concerning Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in China. Additionally, China’s surface 
water regulations were compared to the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) 
National Primary Drinking Water Standards in order to determine the level of stringency reached by 
Chinese standards. Though it was determined that Chinese standards are equally –or more strict –than 
the American standards, implementation and enforcement of regulations remains an issue. 
The effectiveness of some water quantity solutions implemented by the Chinese government 
were explored as well, specifically, the effectiveness of the South-to-North water transfer project was 
analyzed by comparing the water gained from that project to the water saved if more efficient irrigation 
methods were installed under varying scenarios of acceptance for three study years. It was determined 
that the amount of water gained from the entire water transfer project was nearly equal to, or less than, 
the volume of water saved if more efficient irrigation methods were utilized. Additionally, further 
iv 
 
development of rainwater harvesting program in Gansu Province was referenced as another means by 
which to increase the quantity of water available. 
Government priorities concerning various methods of water treatment and distribution were 
addressed as well. Though the government has made major investments in the construction of modern 
treatment plants, requisite investments have not been made in the distribution system. Consequently, 
the collection rates in many areas are low. In order to bridge the gap between infrastructure 
construction and treated water demand, distributed treatment, or point-of-use treatment was also 
explored. However, it was determined that the barriers to entry of point-of-use treatment in China are 
high, and thus, it would be difficult to establish a treatment program. 
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I.  WATER QUALITY, QUANTITY, AND ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ISSUES IN CHINA- AN 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
China occupies an area roughly the size of the continental United States and houses the largest 
population on Earth at 1.31 billion in 2008 (End-of-Year 2007) and 1.338 billion in 2009 according to 
respective Chinese and United States sources. [1][2] Since 1978, China’s Gross Domestic Product has 
grown sixty-eight-fold [1] to become the third-largest economy[2] at $3.656 trillion in 2008[1] (End-of-Year 
2007, assuming an exchange rate of 6.8249 RMB to 1 USD[2]), or $8.789 trillion PPP according to 2009 
estimates.[2] However, China remains a nation in transition. The capitalistic model implemented and 
encouraged by Chinese leaders has caused an historic modernization of the country, yet the justice 
system still faces issues with corruption. [3
The low value-added nature of agriculture[
]  
4
                                                          
1 National Bureau of Statictics of China. China Statistical Yearbook- 2008. Date Accessed: 23 April 2010. 
] has resulted in the prioritizing of the industrial sector over 
the agriculture sector,[4] which will not only affect China’s ability to remain self-sufficient, but will affect 
the many nations of the world[2] who import agricultural products from China as well. Industry and 
agriculture pollute China’s water sources through the dumping of wastewater directly into water bodies 
and from the runoff due to increased fertilizer application, respectively. [4] The pollution of water bodies 
in China is already compromising China’s economic gains; in 2007, economic losses attributed to poor 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm. 
2CIA World Factbook: China. Date Accessed: 22 June 2009. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factbook/geos/CH.html. 
3Becker, Jeffrey. Tackling Corruption at its Source: The National Corruption Prevention Bureau. Journal  
of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 3. 2008.  
4Jiang, Yong. “China’s Water Scarcity.” Journal of Environmental Management, 2009. p. 1-12. 
2 
 
water quality were at least 158 billion yuan[4] (20.78 billion USD based on a 2007 exchange rate of 760.4 
RMB to 100 USD[1]). This economic loss represents 1.16% of China’s annual GDP. [4]  
In addition to economic losses, the degraded water quality in China is greatly impacting human health, 
especially in rural areas where according to the World Bank, more than 300 million people through the 
country consume unsafe drinking water. [5
 In general, China’s environmental policies and associated actions can be viewed through three lenses: 
environmental policy as seen through regulations, policies and projects to increase water quantity, and 
water quality treatment and distribution methods pursued. This paper will focus on each of these areas 
in turn rather than focusing on one specific area; this is to enable a more holistic understanding of the 
political climate and the policy mechanisms employed by the Chinese government. 
] Health effects stemming from the consumption of unsafe 
drinking water can be associated with higher  cancer rates;[4] in China, “the rates of stomach, liver, and 
bladder cancers are highest in rural areas and the mortality rates of liver and stomach cancers in China 
are well above the world averages.” [4] An ongoing World Bank study concluded that “(in China,) 
waterborne diseases, such as diarrhea, cholera, and typhoid…could be reduced by almost 50 percent by 
moving from heavily to moderately polluted water…”[5] The same study estimates that in 2003, nine 
million cases of diarrhea were due to water pollution.[5]  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1National Bureau of Statictics of China. China Statistical Yearbook- 2008. Date Accessed: 23 April 2010. 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2008/indexeh.htm. 
4 Jiang, Yong. “China’s Water Scarcity.” Journal of Environmental Management, 2009. p. 1-12. 
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China- Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” September, 
2006. 
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II. A GENERAL ANALYSIS OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT’S VIEW ON THE ENVIRONMENT THROUGH 
REGULATIONS 
 
 
 
A. CASE STUDY: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTEGRATION (EPI), ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT 
ASSESSMENT (EIA), AND STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT (SEA) IN CHINA 
 
1. Introduction 
China’s fast-paced development that prioritized economic growth over environmental protection has 
led it to become the third-largest economy in the world;[2] however, China has become the world’s  
largest emitter of CO2. 
[6] Realizing that economic growth has come at the expense of the environment, 
the 11th Five-Year-Plan represents a strategic shift toward sustainable water resources development in 
China. [4] This approach comes under the umbrella of “a scientific outlook on development,” [4][7
 
] one of 
the main objectives of the current administration.[6] In order to help achieve this goal, the Chinese 
Ministry for Environmental Protection has been called upon to develop and refine Environmental Impact 
Assessment (in China called Plan EIA, or PEIA) as a capacity building tool for integrating environmental 
concerns into planning activities.[5][6]  
                                                          
2CIA World Factbook: China. Date Accessed: 22 June 2009. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factbook/geos/CH.html. 
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China- Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” September, 
2006. 
6 International Energy Agency. CO2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion Highlights- 2009 Edition. OECD, 2009.  
7 Bina, Olivia, et. al. “Transition from Plan Environmental Impact Assessment to Strategic  
Environmental  Assessment: Recommendations of the Project ‘Policy Instruments for a Chinese Sustainable 
Future.” Stockholm Environment Institute. May 2009. 
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2. Current status of EIA/SEA in China (also known as PEIA) 
The 2002 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Law, which came into force in September 
2003, requires the application of project and plan EIAs to ten categories of ‘specialized plans.’ [5][7] These 
plan categories include industry, agriculture, animal husbandry, forestry, energy, water conservation, 
transportation, urban construction, tourism, and natural resources development. [7] Additionally, EIAs 
are required for four ‘comprehensive development plans,’ including land-use, river basin, coastal, and 
regional development.[7] This comprehensive law, though entitled the “EIA Law,” requires Strategic 
Environmental Assessment (SEA) for programs as well. [8
Comparatively, in the United States, the 1969 National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requires federal 
agencies to complete a detailed statement on “the environmental impact of the proposed action, any 
adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, 
alternatives to the proposed action, the relationship between local short-term uses of man’s 
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and any irreversible and 
irretrievable commitments of resources which would be involved in the proposed action should it be 
implemented.” [
]  
9
While the EIA Law has been in existence for over five years, there have been difficulties with its 
continued and widespread enforcement. [5] According to Professor Wang Canfa of the China University 
of Political Science and Law (via Lin Gu), “the rate of China’s environmental laws and regulations that are 
actually enforced is estimated to be barely 10 percent.”  [
] This statement, which came to be known as an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), 
must be included in every Federal action significantly affecting the quality of the human environment. [9] 
10
                                                          
3Becker, Jeffrey. Tackling Corruption at its Source: The National Corruption Prevention Bureau. Journal  
] While the EIA compliance rate for medium- 
to large-scale projects was close to ninety percent by the late 1990s, the compliance rate for small, local 
projects is unknown (most likely lower due to corruption problems at the local level). [3][5][8] Enforcement 
of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 3. 2008. 
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China- Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” September, 
2006. 
7Bina, Olivia, et. al. “Transition from Plan Environmental Impact Assessment to Strategic  
Environmental  Assessment: Recommendations of the Project ‘Policy Instruments for a Chinese Sustainable 
Future.” Stockholm Environment Institute. May 2009. 
8 Glasson, John, et. al. Introduction to Environmental Impact Assessment, 3rd Ed.  Routledge, 2005.   
9 United States Government. The National Environmental Policy Act of 1969: Title 1- Congressional Declaration of 
National Environmental Policy. http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/regs/nepa/nepaeqia.htm. 
10 Lin, Gu. China Improves Enforcement of Environmental Laws. China Features. 29 September 2005.  
http://www.chinese-embassy.org.uk/eng/zt/Features/t214565.htm. 
5 
 
of the EIA Law is a major issue;[5][7][11] however, the current issues with implementation and decreased 
effectiveness of EIAs are caused principally by lack of quality control and timing of the EIA,[12
3. Problems with Current EIA Practice 
] stemming 
from a historic non-prioritization of the environment and environmental protection in favor of 
growth.[5][7][11]  
a. Critique of EIA- Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment Project in Fuzhou, China: In general, the 
quality of Chinese EIAs is inconsistent; typically the highest quality EIAs (leading examples) are 
conducted for the most high-profile projects where top officials are involved,[7] while the lower-quality 
EIAs come from less visible projects. These projects tend to be in the richest parts of China (the Eastern 
coast and the South)[11]  and are in many cases done in cooperation with an international development 
organization, such as the World Bank, the European Union, or the Asian Development Bank. The EIA that 
is presented here as a case study was conducted for a water supply and wastewater treatment project 
in Fuzhou, China. [13
                                                          
 
] Fuzhou City is located on the Southeastern coast of China and is an autonomous 
economic zone,[13] indicating that it possibly is afforded higher privilege by the Chinese government. This 
EIA exemplifies both typical issues found in Chinese EIAs and atypical aspects that show a departure 
from criticized trends in Chinese EIA practice. The EIA cited herein was prepared for a project (three 
subprojects) that was funded by the Asian Development Bank; [13] thus, final approval of the EIA by an 
outside organization was a necessary part of the process in this case. [13] Consequently, producing a high-
quality EIA that concluded that expansion of the infrastructure for this “regional center for business, 
commerce, and industry,” will have either have no negative environmental effects, or that those effects 
could be mitigated, would have been a priority for the provincial government. [13]  
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China- Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” September, 
2006. 
7Bina, Olivia, et. al. “Transition from Plan Environmental Impact Assessment to Strategic  
Environmental  Assessment: Recommendations of the Project ‘Policy Instruments for a Chinese Sustainable 
Future.” Stockholm Environment Institute. May 2009. 
11 Bina, Olivia. An Environmental Policy Integration Perspective of the Weaknesses and Potentials of  
Current Chinese Practice. Wuppertal Institute. 30 June 2009. 
12 Spengler, Laura. Public Participation in Strategic Environmental Assessment in China. Wuppertal  
Institute, European Union Asia Pro Eco II Programme. June 2009. 
13 Fuzhou Municipal Government, Asian Development Bank. Summary Environmental Impact  
Assessment: Fuzhou Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment Project in the People’s Republic of China. 
May 1998. 
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The actual EIA was prepared by the Fujian Provincial Environmental Protection Research Institute for the 
Fuzhou Municipal Government. [13] In addition to review and approval by the Fujian Environmental 
Protection Bureau and the National Environmental Protection Agency, the EIA was also reviewed by 
Asian Development Bank (ADB) consultants. [13] The EIA was prepared according to both the 
government’s requirements and the Bank’s Environmental Assessment Requirements and Environmental 
Review Procedures (for Summary EIA). Unlike what is typical many construction projects that are not 
overseen by an outside funding organization, construction had not begun for the majority of the project 
components that were within the scope of the EIA. [5][12][13] However, construction was already complete 
for the remainder of the project not being funded by the Asian Development Bank. [13] 
Though the EIA for the Fuzhou projects followed established protocol, some issues with the EIA remain. 
Though alternative scenarios are mentioned, these alternatives are not elaborated upon or fully 
developed; consequently, it is impossible to compare the alternatives with the planned scenario. [13] 
Additionally, no baseline alternative (the “do nothing” alternative) was mentioned for any project. [8][13] 
The decision to locate the water treatment plant for Fuzhou in Yuanzhong village, which “compared with 
the urban area, has poorer education, culture, transportation, communication, and urban facilities” [13] 
demonstrates a general (worldwide) tendency to locate treatment plants in “less desirable” areas.  
Though no threatened plant or animal species live within the areas proposed for the projects, [13] the 
negative effects these projects could possibly have on residents living near the project sites are only 
briefly mentioned. Locating the wastewater treatment plant near a “popular scenic spot that attracts a 
large number of visitors” [13] will most likely affect the area’s economy. Additionally, in each of the three 
projects, the resettlement of some number of households is necessary.[13] Though the water source and 
treatment project will only require the resettlement of ten households, the wastewater treatment plant 
project will “ultimately require the resettlement of about 1500 people,” [13] or almost fifty percent of the 
village’s total population. Interestingly, the EIA did not mention the investigation into any alternatives 
(i.e. alternative locations) that did not require the resettlement of any households, but rather, that the 
resettlement of these people would be “mitigated through compensation packages” and job training if 
necessary. [13] However, it is also important to note that the United States pursues the same course of 
action if resettlement of households is deemed necessary for development or environmental reasons 
under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act of 1970.[14
                                                          
14United States Government. 42 USC Chapter 61- Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition  
] 
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The EIA for the Fuzhou projects is complete in many respects, including in the description of mitigation 
efforts and in outlining how workers’ safety would be ensured during construction; [13] however, the 
public participation aspect that is crucial to EIA preparation is in some ways lacking.[12][13] Though the 
public was informed about the projects through village-level meetings and was able to express their 
concerns through surveys and questionnaires,[13] it is unclear from the EIA whether or any public 
concerns were addressed in the planning of the projects with the exception of concerns related to dust 
and construction noise.[13] Additionally, only the general results of the public surveys are mentioned, 
with each project receiving positive support from most respondents (including the aforementioned 
respondents concerned about dust and construction noise).[13]  
It is important to note that some aspects of the project which are not funded by the ADB (and not part 
of the EIA cited herein) are expected to have environmental impacts as well. [13] A planned dam and 
hydroelectric power plant are part of the overall project, but because they were not financed by the 
ADB, they were outside of the scope of the EIA cited herein. The hydroelectric dam and power plant 
were already approved for construction by the local government (who is financing the project); however, 
it is unclear whether or not an EIA was completed for the project. The construction and operation of a 
dam and its corresponding hydroelectric plant, though, are known to have environmental impacts.[15
b. Barriers to Effective Implementation of EIA: The barriers to effective implementation of EIA presented 
in the above case study for the water supply and wastewater treatment project in Fuzhou, along with 
general problems in Chinese EIA practice (that are typical but not found in the above EIA for Fuzhou) 
stem from a number of structural and cultural factors. 
]  
There is a lack of developed alternatives presented in Chinese EIAs, which is a typical weakness in EIAs 
conducted in countries throughout the world. [7][8] One issue in particular that is seen in China, however, 
is that many EIAs are initiated once a plan is already in its final stages of being drafted, after that plan 
has already been approved as is, or even after construction has already begun.[5][8][12] Thus, even if 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Policies for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs. http://uscode.house.gov/download/pls/42C61.txt. 
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China-Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” Sept., 2006. 
8 Glasson, John, et. al. Introduction to Environmental Impact Assessment, 3rd Ed.  Routledge, 2005 
12 Spengler, Laura. Public Participation in Strategic Environmental Assessment in China. Wuppertal  
Institute, European Union Asia Pro Eco II Programme. June 2009. 
13 Fuzhou Municipal Government, Asian Development Bank. Summary Environmental Impact  
Assessment: Fuzhou Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment Project in the People’s Republic of China. 
May 1998. 
15 Pearce, Fred. Pipe Dreams. Conservation Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 1. January-March 2005.  
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alternative scenarios are created for the purposes of fulfilling EIA requirements, these scenarios will 
have little effect on the actual project design. Additionally, the “preferred option” is, in many cases, 
predetermined by a higher level official; lower level planning officials do not want to risk taking any 
initiative unless they are sure it will meet with the approval of their leaders.[7] Consequently, alternatives 
are not explored in great detail. 
The importance of rank within the Chinese bureaucracy is at the heart of many of the issues that 
currently exist in China. The inseparability of authority from rank[7][11]  is partly due to long-held cultural 
traditions, as well as the governmental (Party) power structure which reinforces those traditions.  
In the governmental hierarchy, the environmental protection organizations have traditionally been 
viewed as the weakest.[7][11] In order to increase the power of the State Environmental Protection 
Administration (SEPA) and demonstrate a commitment to environmental protection, the Chinese 
leadership upgraded the Administration to a Cabinet-level ministry, the Ministry of Environmental 
Protection (MEP).[7] While this promotion seems like a positive move, the MEP is still not considered 
“equal” among the ministries.[7] Additionally, even though the MEP presides over Environmental 
Protection Bureaus (EPBs) in each territory that are charged with enforcement of environmental law, 
those bureaus are also under the authority of the provincial (local) government.[7] The power structure is 
complicated further due to a long-held rule that binding orders cannot be issued between units of the 
same rank; thus Ministries cannot issue orders to (and thus have little control over) provincial 
governments.[7][11] Consequently, it is difficult to enforce proper completion of EIAs, especially on the 
local level, unless the higher-ranking provincial government has a vested interest in environmental 
protection. 
In environmental policy implementation (specifically in completing EIAs), the lack of integration 
between bureaus and the lack of integration between project planning and environmental assessment is 
a common problem.[5][7] According to the Stockholm Environmental Institute, which conducted a two 
year long European Union (EU)-supported project with research institutions in China involved in 
environmental protection and planning,  “fragmentation (in sectors of government)…is partly explained 
by the strict division of power according to rank, and the pervasive culture of avoiding conflict with 
higher-ranking officers and organizations.“ [7]  
A further issue with the bureaucratic structure comes not with the organization of the hierarchy itself, 
but with the incentives for promotion of Party cadres. Since the beginning of China’s transition to a 
more capitalist-style economy, the highest priorities (and thus the criteria upon which promotions are 
based) have been economic gains and “social stability.” [11] According to Chinese thought, social stability 
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itself is dependent primarily on economic gains; ironically, the rate of economic growth has been 
compromised by the degradation in air and water quality caused by prioritizing economic growth over 
environmental health. [4][7] Thus, a change in how promotions are incentivized in the system may 
contribute a great deal to increasing the rate of EIA compliance, accompanied by an improvement in 
environmental quality.[7][11]  
Another primary issue that decreases the effectiveness of EIAs lies not in the governmental hierarchy, 
but in the fact that social impacts, which describe the interaction between society and the environment 
(human health and social justice) are often left out.[7][8][12] This lack of consideration of social impacts is 
not a distinctly Chinese phenomenon but rather, is a general issue with EIAs due most likely to the 
subjective (and qualitative) nature of social impact assessment. [8] Nonetheless, social impacts, as well as 
other environmental impacts can be more accurately predicted if the public is included in project 
scoping and planning. [5][8][12] While other nations have increased the utilization of public input in EIAs,[8] 
Chinese EIAs still demonstrate a lack of public participation, [5][12] and even the participation of other 
bureaus despite the fact that a section on public participation is required in EIA reports. [12] 
Public participation, if used to mean the “stakeholders” in a project, “may refer to the involvement of 
everyone whose interests may be beneficially or adversely affected by a proposal, including authorities, 
experts, concerned and interested citizens, enterprises, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
other stakeholders.” [12] Essentially, “public representation” is represented by three basic categories of 
people: the authority, the experts, and the general public.[12] If any of these three groups are consulted, 
it is typically either the authority or a group of experts.[7][12] According to an interviewee quoted in the 
Stockholm Environmental Institute’s final report on SEA and EPI in China, “current practice 
resembles…the following: the draft plan document is presented to the other actors during a single 
meeting, where they are given a few hours to discuss and comment. The document is often considered 
‘secret’ and will not be available outside the meeting, making it very difficult to make meaningful and 
informed suggestions…” [7] “Public participation” in Chinese EIA usually occurs in the following ways: lack 
of consultation, consultation is requested but is limited in some way to specific groups, consultation is 
requested after the plan has been approved or construction has already begun, or in some cases, public 
participation tools are used to manipulate, rather than to inform.[7][12] 
In her study of public participation in Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) in China, Laura Spengler of 
the Wuppertal Institute analyzed SEAs completed for highway and road network projects in Heilongjiang, 
Henan, and Shaanxi provinces. [12] Though each SEA contained the required public participation section, 
10 
 
Spengler found striking similarities between those sections, even though the proposed projects 
comprised different plans to be constructed in different provinces.[12] Writes Spengler,   
“…the chapters on public participation in the reports are very similar. The wording is mainly the same, 
and even the numbers in the evaluation table of a questionnaire handed out to government officials are 
identical. Thus, it must be assumed that consultation…was realized only in one of three cases and the 
results were copied into the reports on the other SEA studies.” [12] These were subsequently approved, 
sending the message that neither the public participation aspect of the EIA process nor EIAs themselves 
are rigorously analyzed.  
Though in many cases EIAs are (at least in part) available for comment, both the announcement 
informing the public that the document is available for comment and the commenting mechanism itself 
is through the internet; [12] thus, the ability of the common people to make their opinions heard is very 
limited. [12] Additionally, if the request for comments from the public (and the completion of the EIA) 
comes after the project has already been approved, the EIA will have little, if any impact on the plan. In 
one EIA conducted by the World Bank on tourism development in Guizhou, the master plan had been 
approved in 2003, yet the required SEA wasn’t completed until 2007. [12][16
In general, Spengler determined through her analysis that “the current participation procedure in the 
Chinese SEA process is totally ineffective for involvement of the general public.” [12] Due to 
aforementioned factors such as lower-ranking officials who will not offer alternatives to a decision 
handed down by a higher ranking official[7] and the weakness of the MEP in the governmental power 
structure,[7] “agencies lack the motivation and capacity to implement public participation dedicatedly.” 
[12] What results is that public participation procedures only meet the minimum requirements and are 
conducted mainly as an exercise in compliance with regulations. Consequently, the needs of the people 
affected by a plan or project may not be fully addressed. 
] Consequently, concerns 
presented by the public could only have minor impacts on the project. 
                                                          
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China- Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” September, 
2006. 
7Bina, Olivia, et. al. “Transition from Plan Environmental Impact Assessment to Strategic  
Environmental  Assessment: Recommendations of the Project ‘Policy Instruments for a Chinese Sustainable 
Future.” Stockholm Environment Institute. May 2009. 
12 Spengler, Laura. Public Participation in Strategic Environmental Assessment in China. Wuppertal  
Institute, European Union Asia Pro Eco II Programme. June 2009. 
16 World Bank. Strategic Environmental Assessment Study: Tourism Development in the Province of Guizhou, China.  
25 May 2007. 
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Though the aforementioned issues concerning the timing in conducting EIAs and a lack of public 
participation, as well as implementation of EIAs were discussed concerning China, these issues exist in 
the United States as well. [17
A separate issue in the implementation of EIAs practice is a lack of reliable data. [5][7] Reliable 
quantitative data is difficult and costly to obtain (usually requires favors).[7]  However, Chinese officials 
place little trust in qualitative assessments,[7] making the completion of a comprehensive EIA difficult. 
Quantitative data, upon which more accurate predictions of future growth and consequently 
environmental impacts are based,[7][8] cannot be accurate without reliable methods of data collection.[7] 
In recent years, China has received some criticism for reporting possibly inaccurate or questionable data 
to the international community. [5][
] The Council of Environmental Quality (CEQ) conducted a study on the 
effectiveness of NEPA in the United States, [17] and though it was concluded that NEPA was a success, 
“NEPA’s implementation at times has fallen short of its goals. For example…agencies may confuse the 
purpose of NEPA. Some act as if the detailed statement called for (the EIS) is an end in itself…as a 
consequence, the exercise can be one of producing a document to no specific end.”[17] Additionally, in 
some cases consultation was only sought after a decision had already been made, [17] causing the public 
to believe that their concerns have not been heard. [17] Consequently, the EIS sometimes becomes more 
about litigation, whereby the public opposes the plan not because it is not environmentally sound, but 
because they feel as if they have no representation in the plan.[17] Thus, in the United States as well as 
China, a full range of alternatives may not be explored,[7][17] and the document produced may not always 
be high-quality.[17] 
18
                                                          
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China- Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” September, 
] Access to data is conditional upon political influence and rank;[7] 
thus it is difficult for the comparatively weaker environmental agencies to procure the data necessary 
for EIA reports.[7] However, both the encouragement by the international community for China to 
establish a better data collection system and the agreement the Chinese government has entered into 
with the United States Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) to cooperate on data collection should 
provide a stimulus to increase both access to data and quality control of data. [18]  
2006. 
7Bina, Olivia, et. al. “Transition from Plan Environmental Impact Assessment to Strategic  
Environmental  Assessment: Recommendations of the Project ‘Policy Instruments for a Chinese Sustainable 
Future.” Stockholm Environment Institute. May 2009. 
17Council on Environmental Quality. National Environmental Policy Act: A Study of its Effectiveness After Twenty 
Five Years. January, 1997.  
18Eliperin, Juliet. “U.S. and China reach accord on data collection.” The Washington Post. 19  
November, 2009. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article /2009/11/ 18/ 
AR2009111803058.html. 
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4. How Chinese Environmental Policy (Concerning EIA practice) Affects Water Quality Improvement 
Initiatives  
Water and wastewater infrastructure-related projects are considered to be a high enough priority by the 
Chinese government that this category is included in the list of projects requiring an EIA.[7] Though these 
projects are seen as important, it can be hypothesized that the general patterns seen in EIA practice for 
other, similarly essential projects are reflected in plans for water and wastewater supply and treatment 
infrastructure. As evidenced by the aforementioned EIA of a water supply and wastewater treatment 
project in Fuzhou,[13] greater average wealth (typically located in Southern and/or coastal areas, of 
which Fuzhou is both) is associated with more attention paid to the environment.[7] More complete EIAs 
are usually conducted in areas like Fuzhou where there is a greater economic base due primarily to the 
fact that basic needs are fulfilled, enabling residents to concentrate on higher-level issues such as 
environmental protection.[7] Additionally, since the Southern and coastal cities are centers for commerce 
and technology in China,[7][13] there is a greater vested interest in those cities’ continued prosperity.  
Though this attention paid to the environment indicates that sound EIA practice, leading to greater 
compliance with environmental policies does exist in China, it suggests that sound practice is more 
prevalent in affluent provinces.[7]  Therefore, it is very possible that areas that would benefit most from 
more environmentally sound measures may not be helped, and in fact, may not be in compliance with 
EIA laws due in large part to insufficient funds.[5] Consequently, some areas with poor water quality and 
little infrastructure may not see much improvement unless a strong, influential leader (Party official) is 
present.[7] 
The common issue previously mentioned concerning a lack of well-developed alternatives in Chinese 
EIAs was further explored by the Stockholm Environmental Institute in its final report on Environmental 
Policy Integration (EPI) and Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) in China.[7] Table 1 (next page) is 
an adaptation of the “Types of Alternatives”[7] table generated by the Stockholm Environmental Institute 
for use as a tool for Chinese environmental planners to better develop alternative scenarios. Though the 
table in the Institute’s report specifically addresses the energy and transportation sectors,[7] Table 1 is an 
exercise in generating questions to create alternatives for a theoretical water and/or wastewater supply 
and treatment infrastructure-related project. 
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Table 1: Considerations in Proposing Types of Alternatives for Water and Wastewater Supply and 
Treatment EIA 
Level of 
Decision 
Definition/Guiding Questions 
Water/Wastewater Supply and Treatment 
Need or 
Demand 
Is it necessary? 
Is the demand necessary or can it be met with more efficient use of water? 
Can increasing the price of supply/treatment decrease demand? 
Can the demand be met without new infrastructure? 
Input and 
Supply 
Can we use what we have now? 
Can the current water supply be augmented by rainwater harvesting? 
Can the current infrastructure be expanded rather than building a new treatment plant? 
Mode or 
Process 
How should it be done? 
Which type of disinfection should be utilized, keeping in mind the environmental and 
health effects of DBPs? 
Should energy-saving technologies be employed (higher initial cost but saves money in 
the long term)? 
If using activated sludge, how will the biosolids be handled? Will biosolids be used in 
land application?  
Does the treatment plant need to be equipped to handle stormwater flows?  
Location 
Where should it go? 
What site location will ensure that resident displacement is minimized (ideally none)? 
How can the site be located to address possible concerns of noise, odor, and aesthetics? 
How can the treatment plant be located to best neutralize the threat of an upset (i.e. 
maximize distance from a chemical plant)  
Detail 
Timing and detailed implementation 
When should the plant be built to meet the demand? 
What growth in demand (capacity) should be included in the design to account for low-, 
medium-, and high-growth scenarios? 
If expansion of water and wastewater treatment infrastructure (i.e. new treatment 
plants) is needed, in what sequence should they be carried out? 
*adopted from [7], Annex: Table F 
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5. Suggestions for the Improvement of EIA Good Practice 
Increasing public participation in EIAs will allow for a greater understanding of the social impacts 
of a project;[5][7][12] however, it is important to educate the public on the importance of environmental 
preservation (and the consequences of prioritizing economic gains while overlooking environmental 
effects).[5][7][13] Currently, China’s main way of disseminating information (through “campaigns”) does 
not translate into long-term sustainable uptake and implementation of an idea.[11] Thus, in order to 
spread environmental ideas, increasing the quality of education, rather than the quantity of people 
reached, should be the new goal.[11] If the public is able to gain greater knowledge on the environment, 
they will be more likely to comment on future EIAs, and those comments will be informed and thus 
more useful to the organization conducting the EIA.  
Additionally, incorporating EIA and EPI thought into the training of party officials, [11] as well as using the 
completion of high-quality EIAs as a criterion in Party leaders’ annual performance evaluations [11] will 
incentivize the consideration of environmental impacts. If there is an impetus to compose higher quality 
EIAs, then it is expected that there will be a corresponding increase in the quality and amount of data 
being collected, as well as a greater sharing of data. However, in order to increase the accuracy of 
predicted environmental impacts, the use of computer modeling is necessary.[7] Conducting sensitivity 
analyses using reliable data in order to decrease uncertainty is essential in forecasting the effects of 
different levels of growth.[7] Increasing the accuracy of EIAs will further increase their use in design, 
especially at the more preliminary stages. 
Finally, the Chinese government can help to ensure a greater completeness of EIAs by making its 
practices more transparent [5][7] to the international community, who can act as a quality control 
watchdog.  [18] Already, China has cooperated with many different international bodies on development 
projects, including the World Bank,[5][16] the Asian Development Bank,[13] the EU,[7][11][12] and various 
sectors within the United States Government.[18][19
                                                          
11 Bina, Olivia. An Environmental Policy Integration Perspective of the Weaknesses and Potentials of  
] The US Department of Agriculture and the US 
Current Chinese Practice. Wuppertal Institute. 30 June 2009. 
12 Spengler, Laura. Public Participation in Strategic Environmental Assessment in China. Wuppertal  
Institute, European Union Asia Pro Eco II Programme. June 2009. 
13 Fuzhou Municipal Government, Asian Development Bank. Summary Environmental Impact  
Assessment: Fuzhou Water Supply and Wastewater Treatment Project in the People’s Republic of China. 
May 1998. 
19 The White House-Office of the Press Secretary. “US-China Joint Statement.” 17 November 2009.  
http://www.chinafaqs.org/files/chinainfo/US_China_Joint_Statement_White_House_Nov_17.pdf. 
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Environmental Protection have both been working with the Chinese government in the areas of 
agriculture and environmental law (and enforcement), respectively. [20
 
] Specifically, the USEPA is 
assisting China in increasing its data collection efforts,[20] which would serve to not only increase the 
quality in China’s currently available data, but would also improve the effectiveness of the estimates 
upon which EIAs are based. In general, the opening up of China’s EIA process will help encourage the 
process to become more representative of the needs of both the common people and their 
environment and thus, more democratic.  
B. CASE STUDY: A COMPARISON OF DRINKING WATER REGULATIONS IN CHINA AND THE UNITED 
STATES 
In addition to the EIA law, there are a number of other environmental laws in place. China’s “Fifteen 
Small Shutdown Policy”[5] has caused the closure of enterprises in the fifteen most polluting industries, 
and its promotion of the use of Environmental Impact Assessments[5][7][11][12][13][16] for new construction 
and ISO14000 certification demonstrates a desire to become a world class competitor.[5] China’s water 
regulations21 are equally as strong as those found in the United States22
 
 as depicted by Tables 2 and 3 
below, which compare some of China’s basic standards for surface water quality[21] with the EPA’s 
National Primary Drinking Water Standards. [22]  
 
 
 
                                                          
20 USEPA. China Environmental Law Initiative Homepage. Updated 10 December 2009.  
http://www.epa.gov/ogc/china/initiative_home.htm. 
21 Ministry of Environmental Protection, People’s Republic of China.  
http://english.mep.gov.cn/standards_reports/standards/water_environment/quality_standard/200710/
W020061027509896672057.pdf. 
22 USEPA. List of National Primary and Secondary Drinking Water Contaminants.  
http://www.epa.gov/safewater/contaminants/index.html#organic. 
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Table 2: MEP (China) Surface Water Regulations (left) [21] 
Table 3: USEPA (US) National Primary and Secondary Drinking Water Regulations (right) [22] 
Basic Standards and Limits Primary Std. Notes Sec. Std. 
 
Class 
I 
Class 
II 
Class 
III 
Class 
IV 
Class 
V 
MCL MCLG 
  
pH 
  
6~9 
  
NL* NL* 
 
6.5~8.5 
DO 7.5 6 5 3 2 NL* NL* 
 
NL* 
permanganate 
index 
2 4 6 10 15 NL* NL* 
 
NL* 
COD 15 15 20 30 40 NL* NL* 
 
NL* 
BOD5 3 3 4 6 10 NL* NL* 
 
NL* 
ammonium 
nitrate 
 (NH3-N) 
0.15 0.5 1 1.5 2 10 10 
(nitrate 
as N) 
NL* 
total 
phosphorous 
0.02 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 NL* NL* 
 
NL* 
total nitrogen 0.2 0.5 1 1.5 2 1 1 
(nitrite 
as N) 
NL* 
copper 0.01 1 1 1 1 
action 
level=1.3 
1.3 
 
1 
zinc 0.05 1 1 1.5 1.5 NL* NL* 
 
5 
fluoride 1 1 1 1.5 1.5 4 4 
 
2 
selenium 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.05 
 
NL* 
arsenic 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.01 0 
 
NL* 
mercury 
0.000
05 
0.000
05 
0.000
1 
0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 
 
NL* 
cadmium 0.001 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.01 0.005 0.005 
 
NL* 
chromium 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.1 0.1 0.1 
 
NL* 
lead 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.1 
action 
level= .01
5 
zero 
 
NL* 
cyanide 0.005 0.05 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
NL* 
volatile 
phenols 
0.002 0.002 0.005 0.01 0.1 0.001 zero 
penta 
chloro 
phenol 
NL* 
oils 0.05 0.05 0.5 0.5 1 NL* NL* 
 
NL* 
surface 
activity-anions 
0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 NL* NL* 
 
NL* 
sulfide 0.05 0.1 0.2 0.5 1 NL* NL* sulfate 250 
total/fecal 
coliforms 
200 2000 10000 
2000
0 
4000
0 
5% TC 
pos/mth 
0 ppm 
 
NL* 
     *NL= not listed 
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While many positive changes have been made in pollution prevention regulations, issues still remain. 
China passed its Prevention and Control of Water Pollution law 1984[5] and its latest water quality 
regulations in 2002, [5] yet there remains a dramatic difference in China’s water quality and that of the 
United States. 
A number of factors have contributed to the lack of improvement in China’s water quality. As with the 
implementation of EIAs, the way the Chinese bureaucracy is organized results in “a lack of horizontal 
and vertical coordination, and inter-agency communication is generally poor. Agencies often duplicate 
tasks and responsibilities, which is not only inefficient, but also results in inconsistencies.” [5] This 
problem is exemplified by the Ministry of Environmental Protection (MEP) and the Ministry of Water 
Resources (MWR). The roles and mandates of these two organizations in water treatment and pollution 
control are often unclear, causing overlap in some areas while neglecting others.[5] Figure 1 below 
depicts the bureaucratic hierarchy for the different branches of the government involved in water 
quality and pollution management.[5] 
 
 
Figure 1: Ministries and Authorities at the National Level Involved in Water (Quality and) Pollution 
Management [5] 
 
 
Additionally, the role of the central government is often overemphasized and “the regulatory system is 
incomplete and complicated, which results in lack of integration and efficiency in implementation and 
enforcement.” [5] Regulation is typically not market-based; thus many government agencies have 
problems enforcing environmental laws when they conflict with local development plans, especially if 
those plans have strong political backing.[5] Writes Cai, “For local governments, the strong wish for 
economic development always overrides the responsibility of environment protection.”23
                                                          
3Becker, Jeffrey. Tackling Corruption at its Source: The National Corruption Prevention Bureau. Journal  
 This issue 
would be alleviated if the government would seek more private investment in dealing with pollution 
of Chinese Political Science, Vol. 13, No. 3. 2008. 
4 Jiang, Yong. “China’s Water Scarcity.” Journal of Environmental Management, 2009. p. 1-12. 
11 Bina, Olivia. An Environmental Policy Integration Perspective of the Weaknesses and Potentials of  
Current Chinese Practice. Wuppertal Institute. 30 June 2009. 
23 Cai, Ximing. “Water stress, water transfer and social equity in Northern China- Implications for policy 
reforms.”  Journal of Environmental Management, No. 87, p. 14-25. Available 6 March 2007. 
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control, which it has begun to do under the 10th Five-Year-Plan (2001-2005).[5] One other related issue, 
as discussed above, is the government’s “close-down policy.” This policy applies to industries as well as 
to non-compliant water treatment plants; firms that are highly polluting are given a warning to comply 
with standards or they are faced with closure. However, “application of the close-down policy is closely 
linked to local development policies…regulators are less likely to enforce closure in areas where local 
economic development is weak.” [5][11] 
Corruption within the system has hampered the enforcement of regulations as well. [3][11] Writes Cai, 
“Current water transfers follow the priorities of local government that are often driven by short-sighted 
economic profits.” [23] Additionally, the Fifteen Small Shutdown Policy began a restructuring of priorities, 
where rather than investing in necessary infrastructure repair and modernization, industries and 
water/wastewater treatment plants alike that failed to meet effluent standards were shut down. This 
threat of shutdown in turn can cause a misreporting of data by managers who want to remain in 
operation. [24
Water pollution is seen as a major issue internationally, and the Chinese government has made a 
distinct shift in their rhetoric[[4][7][11] towards a greater prioritization of the environment, sustainable 
development, and water pollution control. However, how the State allocates its spending indicates a 
lower prioritization for two areas that could greatly contribute to an increase in water quality: 
environmental protection and education. “In the past three decades, investments in environmental 
protection accounted for only 0.68%, 0.81%, and 1.19% of China’s GDP.” [4] In 1999, China spent only 
1.9% of its GDP on education [2]; in comparison, the United States spent 5.9% of its GDP on education in 
2009.[2] The small percentage of GDP allocated to education spending may play a role in the general lack 
of knowledge concerning water quality issues.[5]  
] Additionally, decreased economic growth in locations where industries have been closed 
has resulted in the re-opening of those industries, nullifying the previous decreased pollution load. [5] 
The issue of education, especially environmental education of both company managers and local people 
in general cannot be overemphasized. [5][7]  “Both enterprise management and environmental 
management awareness levels are low.” [5] Thus, it can be difficult to convince firms to comply with 
voluntary initiatives, such as ISO14000, or at least to view complying with regulations as a priority. As 
mentioned above, the Chinese government spends a very small percentage of total GDP on education, 
                                                          
24 Gao, Di. Personal Interview. 5 June 2009. 
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and if that trend does not change, the country will not be able to achieve the goals set by both the 
Chinese government itself and by the United Nations (Millennium Development Goals).[25
Furthermore, the majority of the population does not believe that their water is in great need of 
treatment,[24] mainly due to  水土不服 (shuǐ tǔ bù fú), a commonly held belief that drinking water from 
a different area of China from ones’ own will make one sick due to one not being acclimated to that 
environment yet. [24][
] 
26
 
] This belief has contributed to the lack of a discerned public need for an increase 
in the availability of higher-quality drinking water. [24] In order to create recognition in the public mindset 
concerning the importance of environmental protection, specifically dealing with water, the 
recommendations of the World Bank in their 2006 study[5] should be followed.  “In order to effectively 
manage its water resources and reduce pollution levels, the Government of China must generate a 
greater level of environmental awareness and sense of responsibility among the general public. This will 
require environmental education initiatives and more transparent information on emissions and water 
quality.” [5] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2CIA World Factbook: China. Date Accessed: 22 June 2009. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factbook/geos/CH.html. 
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China- Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” September, 
2006. 
7Bina, Olivia, et. al. “Transition from Plan Environmental Impact Assessment to Strategic  
Environmental  Assessment: Recommendations of the Project ‘Policy Instruments for a Chinese Sustainable 
Future.” Stockholm Environment Institute. May 2009. 
25UN Millennium Project 2005. “Health, Dignity, and Development: What Will it Take?” Task Force on Water and  
Sanitation, 2005.  
26 Li, Zhaoguo. “Zhong Xi Yi Jie He Xue Bao (中西医结合学报).” Journal of Chinese Integrative  
Medicine,Vol. 7, No. 4, p.383-388. Published online 15 April 2009. 
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECTIVENESS OF CURRENT SOLUTIONS TO WATER QUALITY AND QUANTITY 
ISSUES IMPLEMENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT 
 
 
 
A. COMPARISON OF THE SOUTH-NORTH WATER TRANSFER PROJECT WITH INCREASED IRRIGATION 
EFFICIENCY 
 
Water quality is a major issue in China, but a scarcity of water resources represents the other major 
water issue China faces. According to Jiang, “in normal water years, among 662 cities, 300 will have 
insufficient water supplies and 110 will experience severe water shortages; 30 out of 32 metropolitan 
areas with populations of more than 1 million people will struggle to meet water demands.” [4] This lack 
of water is due in large part to the geographical layout of China; while Southern China enjoys a water 
surplus, Northern China is mainly comprised of arid and semi-arid lands.[4] Specifically, “average annual 
precipitation gradually decreases…from more than 2000 mm at the southeastern coastline to usually 
less than 200 mm at the northwestern hinterlands.” [4] Consequently, the water quality in the South is 
typically better than that in the North, mainly due to the dilution of pollutants by a larger quantity of 
water (see Figure 2, next page).[5] As Figure 2 demonstrates, the proportion of higher quality water 
bodies is much greater in the South than in the North.[5] 
 
 
Figure 2: A Comparison of Water Quality in Water Bodies in Southern and Northern China, 1991-2005 
[5] 
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Additionally, there is a lack of a system of both legally enforceable water rights and economic restraints 
in place to regulate the demand for water (water resource allocation is controlled on the supply side).[4]  
As industry in Northern China continues to grow and compete with agriculture for a dwindling supply of 
water, the pumping of water from deeper and deeper wells is resulting in the depletion of aquifers 
under cities,[4] land subsidence,[4] and salinization[4] of freshwater resources. Increasing water efficiency, 
desalination, piping in water from remote locations, and rainwater harvesting are all methods that the 
Chinese government is currently employing to some degree in order to alleviate its water crisis.  While 
these methods vary in their environmental impacts and the degree to which they are sustainable, three 
methods in particular will be focused upon below: long-distance water transfers, increasing water 
efficiency, and rainwater harvesting. 
In order to help solve both the water resources issue and the water quality issue in Northern China, in 
2003, a massive engineering project was undertaken to build a pipeline from the Yangtze River in the 
south to Beijing in the North. This project, called the South-to-North Water Transfer Project, is expected 
to cost at least 62 billion RMB (9.084 billion USD based on an exchange rate of 6.8249 RMB to 1 USD[2]). 
[4] Writes Fred Pierce, “the first Yangtze water should be flowing north along a canal…in 2008. The canal 
will be 60 m wide and as long as France, crossing 219 rivers, 500 roads, and 120 railway lines as it takes 
some 12 km3 of water a year…to Beijing.”[15] Additionally, China plans to build two more pipelines; one 
diverting water to Eastern China, and another diverting water west to Tibet.[4][15] The entire project is 
expected to take about twenty years to complete and will divert an amount of water northward 
comparable to the current flow of the Yellow River, which has been over-used and heavily polluted by 
Northern industries and residents (see Figure 3, below).[15]  
 
 
Figure 3: Map of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project [4] 
 
 
While this project will provide the North with much needed water, it is receiving criticism from some 
environmentalists, who see the project as solving one problem while creating a whole host of new issues. 
Dams have already been shown to cause extensive damage to local ecosystems,[15] and drawing from 
that example, environmentalists believe that “transfers between basins will further destabilize 
ecosystems and shift predator species and diseases from one river system to another.” [15] Instead, they 
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argue that it is better to seek “soft solutions,” the most appropriate being to engage in rainwater 
harvesting and better water resources management.[15] In agriculture, farmers could use drip irrigation 
and seeds that have been engineered to grow on less water, and the government could invest in finding 
and fixing leaks in their pipelines.[15]  
The World Bank also notes that the pipelines will pass through some of the most heavily water-polluted 
areas in China which much be remediated through the course of the project;[5] as the pipelines are 
constructed, the average required improvement in water quality is between 82 and 99 percent for major 
pollutants like BOD, COD, nitrogen, and oils.[5] However, “China has no track record in cleaning up 
polluted rivers at this level.” [5] Another concern is that the total cost of the project could drive the price 
of water high enough that many consumers could not afford the new supply,[5] those who the South-to-
North Water Transfer project intended to serve would not be able to take advantage of the increased 
water supply.  
While there are opponents of the South-North water transfer, advocates exist as well. [27
In order to ascertain the effectiveness of the South-to-North Water Transfer Project (in its entirety), a 
comparison was made between the water gained from the transfer project versus the water saved 
through installing more efficient irrigation systems. Agriculture was focused upon due to the fact that it 
is the industry with the highest water needs.[27] Irrigation efficiency in China is currently around .45,[4] 
while in developing countries, it is between .7 and .8;[4] thus, much improvement could be made in the 
area of water efficiency. Table 4 (next page) depicts the inputs and assumptions used in the analysis, as 
well as the respective sources from which that information was gathered. 
] These 
advocates argue that the only way to satisfy the great water needs of Northern China is to divert water 
from the South.[27] Additionally, if the project is accompanied by a strong environmental protection plan, 
then the damage to ecosystems will be minimal. [27] In conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the South-
to-North Water Transfer Project using Decision Support Systems, Feng concluded that “through an 
increment[al increase] of water supply by the S2N Project and proper policy-making, if a city such as 
Beijing pursues a sustainable development strategy, the gap between water demand and supply can 
eventually be closed.” [27] However, this study only took into account Beijing itself without consideration 
of the rest of the North China plain,[27] and the needs of agriculture were only addressed in Feng’s 
allotment of increased (treated) industrial sewage to agricultural use. 
                                                          
27 Feng, Shan, et. al. “Assessing the impacts of South-to-North Water Transfer Project with decision  support  
systems.” Decision Support Systems, No. 42, p. 1989-2003. Available 1 January 2005. 
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Table 4: Inputs and Assumptions used in Analysis of South-to-North Water Transfer Project vs. 
Irrigation Efficiency 
The given information was as follows: The assumptions were as follows: 
• irrigation efficiency in China: .45 [4] 
• 1st part of South-to-North water 
transfer complete; adds 12 km3 water 
[15] 
• irrigation efficiency in developed 
countries: .7-.8 [4] 
• no water from 1st part of South-to-
North water transfer going to 
agriculture [15][27] (leaves 66% total for 
agriculture) 
• amount of water used by agriculture (N. 
China): 185.7 billion m3 in 2005 [4] 
projected: 210.5 billion m3 in 2030 [4] 
• most (2/3) water from pipelines going 
to municipal and industrial uses [4] 
(leaves ~20% for agriculture) 
• amount of water diverted North for 
pipeline done in 2008: 12 km3 [15][27] 
• 13% increase in water use is spread 
out evenly over 25 years [4] 
• amount of water diverted North for S2N 
water transfer: 45 billion m3/yr [4][5] 
• pipeline finished in 2008 cost 1/3 of 
projected total 
• % of total water diverted going to 
agriculture: 20%* (see assumptions) 
• 6% inflation rate/yr from 2008-2030 
• water used by agriculture increases 13% 
from 2005-2030 [4] 
• whole South-to-North water transfer 
project done by 2030 [15]* 
• total cost of South-to-North water 
transfer project: 62 billion RMB (9.084 
million USD) [4] 
• cost to install sprinkler irrigation: 3000 
RMB per ha[28
• inflation rate: 6% (2008), 4.8% (2007) [2] 
] (439.57 USD) 
                                                          
2CIA World Factbook: China. Date Accessed: 22 June 2009. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factbook/geos/CH.html. 
4 Jiang, Yong. “China’s Water Scarcity.” Journal of Environmental Management, 2009. p. 1-12. 
5World Bank. “Discussion Papers: China- Water Quality Management and Institutional Considerations.” September, 
2006. 
15Pearce, Fred. Pipe Dreams. Conservation Magazine, Vol. 6, No. 1. January-March 2005. 
27 Feng, Shan, et. al. “Assessing the impacts of South-to-North Water Transfer Project with decision  support  
systems.” Decision Support Systems, No. 42, p. 1989-2003. Available 1 January 2005. 
28 Lohmar, Bryan, et. al. "China's Agricultural Water Policy Reforms: Increasing Investment, Resolving  
Conflicts, and Revising Incentives." Market and Trade Economics Division, Economic Research Service, U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. Agriculture Information Bulletin No. 782. March, 2003. 
*Note: Jiang gives an estimate of 2014 and 2050 for 
the completion of the second and third pipelines [4] 
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The amount of water consumed by farmers per year was used to estimate the amount of water wasted 
by those farmers if there is no change in irrigation efficiency for three different years (2005, 2030, and 
extrapolated for 2008). The year 2008 was included in the analysis as it was the year the first pipeline 
was completed. The values calculated were compared with the amount of water wasted per year if 
100% of farmers switch to seventy and eighty percent efficient irrigation equipment by the three 
scenario years. The difference between the amount of water wasted under the “do nothing scenario” 
and a change to a higher irrigation efficiency of .7 or .8 by each of the scenario years yields the amount 
of water saved per year by farmers in Northern China.  The results of the water savings per year analysis 
are outlined in Table 5 below. Some of the inputs, which were used in another analysis, are located in 
Table 6.  
 
 
Table 5: Total Water Savings per Year Based on Various Scenarios for Adoption of More Efficient 
Irrigation Equipment 
Scenario 
no change to 70% irrigation 
efficiency (m3) 
no change to 80% irrigation 
efficiency (m3) 
100% adopt in 2005 46,425,000,000 64,995,000,000 
100% adopt by 2008 45,555,924,000 64,415,616,000 
100% adopt by 2030 38,985,000,000 60,035,000,000 
 
 
 
It was concluded that a 100% adoption of 70% efficient irrigation equipment by 2005, 2008, and 2030 
would result in a 46.4 billion m3, 45.6 billion m3, and 39 billion m3 per year water savings, respectively. A 
100% adoption of 80% efficient equipment by 2005, 2008, and 2030 would result in a 65 billion m3, 64.4 
billion m3, and a 60 billion m3 per year water savings, respectively. Thus, all of the values calculated for 
water savings per year under the various scenarios are greater than or equal to the entire per year 
projected amount of water received from all three pipelines, 45 billion m3 per year. [4] 
After verifying that the water savings from installing more efficient irrigation equipment could be 
greater than or equal to the water received from the entire South to North water transfer project, the 
cost to complete the remainder of the project was calculated based on an inflation rate of six percent 
per year. [2] Estimates of the total cost of the project [4] and the assumed cost of the first (finished) 
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pipeline were utilized to approximate the cost of the project if finished by 2030 at 177.4 billion RMB. 
Using an inflation-adjusted cost of 3000 RMB (439.57 USD based on an exchange rate of 6.8249 RMB to 
1 USD) per hectare to install a more efficient type of irrigation,[28] it was determined that the money 
earmarked for the remainder of the transfer project could instead be used to subsidize the installation 
of more efficient irrigation equipment on 13.8 million hectares of land. The results of each step in the 
calculation process are detailed in Tables 6 (below) and 7 (next page). In addition to saving water 
through more efficient irrigation methods in the agricultural sector, the use of rainwater harvesting 
systems, discussed below, could provide yet another source of water for all of the major water-
consuming sectors in China: agricultural, industrial, and municipal. 
 
 
Table 6: Inputs in Water Savings per Year and Cost of South-to-North Water Transfer vs. Installation of 
More Efficient Irrigation Equipment Calculations 
*percent per year increase in water 
use 
0.52 irrigation efficiency China 0.45 
*percent increase in water use by 
2008 
1.56 
irrigation efficiency developed 
countries 
0.7 
0.8 
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Table 7: Cost of South-to-North Water Transfer vs. Installation of More Efficient Irrigation Equipment 
Year 2005 *2008 (interpolated) 2030 
amt used agr. (m3) 185,700,000,000 188,596,920,000 210,500,000,000 
 
amt farmers get from S2N 
trans. 
0 0 6,600,000,000 
cost S2N trans. 62,000,000,0001 24,614,330,6672 177,397,323,0833 
                     
no. ha subsidized to switch 20,666,666.67 6,888,888.894 13,777,777.78 
 
amt reaches crops no change 83,565,000,000 84,868,614,000 94,725,000,000 
amt reaches crops .7 129,990,000,000 132,017,844,000 147,350,000,000 
amt reaches crops .8 148,560,000,000 150,877,536,000 168,400,000,000 
 
amt wasted no change 102,135,000,000 103,728,306,000 115,775,000,000 
amt wasted .7 55,710,000,000 56,579,076,000 63,150,000,000 
amt wasted .8 37,140,000,000 37,719,384,000 42,100,000,000 
 
 
 
 
 
B. CASE STUDY: RAINWATER HARVESTING IN GANSU PROVINCE- A SUCCESS STORY 
 
Though the Chinese government is still embarking on large-scale engineering projects, they have 
invested in rainwater catchment systems in limited areas as well.[29
                                                          
29 Zhu, Qiang and Li, Yuanhong. “Harvesting Water.” LEISA Magazine, 2003. 
 http://www.farmingsolutions.org/successtories/stories.asp?id=146. 
] Following the model set in Gansu 
Province,[29] rainwater harvesting is currently being employed in some rural areas, in order to help 
alleviate the water scarcity issues found in northern and western China. Gansu Province lies in a semi-
arid region of China whose inhabitants are some of the poorest in the nation.[29] Rainfall is scarce and 
falls mainly between July and September, severely limiting the number and type of crops that can be 
planted.[29] The groundwater that is serves the region is of a poor quality, and the river water has a high 
salt content.[29] Additionally, because Gansu is mountainous, it is difficult to pipe water there from 
2reflects finished first pipeline 
cost 
4reflects cost of first pipeline 
only 
1reflects projected 
cost [4] 
3remainder projected cost 
(inflation adjusted, assumes 
first pipeline done) 
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nearby provinces.[29] All of these issues combined to make Gansu Province an ideal place to begin a 
rainwater harvesting program.  
The Gansu Research Institute for Water Conservancy began its rainwater harvesting project in 1988,[29] 
and with the help of government subsidies, not only helped farmers install rainwater collecting tanks on 
their properties, but also educated them as to when the best time was to selectively irrigate crops.[29] 
The project proved to be very successful, and “by the end of 2001 there were 2.2 million new tanks 
making the irrigation of 236,000 ha of land possible. By this time, those benefiting from the…project had 
gone up to nearly two million.” [29] The Chinese government has greatly expanded the rainwater 
harvesting project, which has not only greatly increased crop yields, but has also allowed the farmers of 
Gansu Province to plant crops that have higher water needs (i.e. tomatoes).[29] The ability to raise cash 
crops has thus greatly increased these farmers’ income and stimulated the local economy.  
Greenhouses have also been developed for this area, the roofs of which are used as additional 
catchment sources.[29] The utilization of greenhouses has enabled farmers to further diversify the crops 
that can be grown; farmers have reached the point financially that “investment [in the greenhouse] can 
be recovered in two to three years.” [29] The success of this project can be attributed to several factors: 
individual (as opposed to state) ownership of the rainwater harvesting systems, affordability, easy 
acceptance by the farmers (already a traditional practice), and thorough preparation and good project 
management by the Gansu Research Institute for Water Conservancy. [29] 
 
C. FACTORS THAT HINDER THE SUCCESS OF THE VARIOUS SOLUTIONS ANALYZED 
The pressure placed on China’s water resources by the expanding industrial, municipal, and agricultural 
sectors [4][5] is further complicated by China’s lopsided rainfall pattern that runs counter to its 
agricultural needs. “In most areas of the country, precipitation within four consecutive 
months…accounts for 70% of annual precipitation. This…pattern of precipitation leads to a serious risk 
of flooding as well as drought, especially in northern China. Runoffs of the Hai and Huai rivers fall to 70% 
of their averages every four years and to 50% every 20 years.” [4] Even though many areas in Northern 
China are water-starved and water is wasted through inadequately maintained infrastructure 
(specifically in irrigation), farmers have little incentive to save water.[4][5]  According to Jiang, “It is 
estimated that current household expenditures for water only account for about 1.2% of disposable 
income. This percentage is lower than the 2% level that stimulates water-saving behavior and is much 
lower than the 4% in developed countries.” [4] 
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Though the South-to-North water transfer could bring much needed relief to the North,[27] the 
environmental effects that will occur during construction, as well as the ecosystem damage that comes 
from transferring water between two vastly different environments render the project 
unsustainable.[5][15] Invasive species have already caused massive amounts of damage in the United 
States and could greatly harm species diversity in China as well. Additionally, as discussed above in 
Section III. A., the water savings gained from increasing irrigation efficiency in agriculture are greater 
than the amount of water Northern China would receive from the South-to-North water transfer. 
Increasing the price of water and forgoing the completion of the South-to-North water transfer project 
could help to both subsidize and incentivize water efficiency.[4] If government programs to develop 
rainwater harvesting and install more efficient irrigation equipment are successful in the agricultural 
sector, they could be pursued in the industrial sector as well.  
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IV. A COMPARISON OF CENTRALIZED WATER TREATMENT VERSUS POINT-OF-USE WATER TREATMENT 
INITIATIVES 
 
 
 
A. GOVERNMENT PRIORITIES 
 
The Chinese government has been dramatically increasing its investment in the construction and 
expansion of centralized water and wastewater treatment since 1998. [5] While this is an important step 
in supplying the nation with clean water, there are some issues that arise when focusing on only one 
solution. Though there is an urgent need to develop treatment infrastructure,[4][5] the construction of 
permanent solutions can be both costly and time-consuming. According to the World Bank, between 
1998 and 2004, investments in municipal and industrial wastewater treatment plants and sewage 
systems in the fourteen provinces and cities in Northern China totaled about 49 billion yuan and have 
been steadily increasing over the study period. In fact, between 1998 and 2003, annual investment in 
sewers (in northern regions) increased 272 percent. [5] However, as previously mentioned (see Section 
II.A), investment primarily flows to more developed areas.[5][7] On average thirty percent of the country 
was served by centralized wastewater treatment in 2003, yet the average served in Beijing was up to 
fifty percent. [5] In northern Hubei province, conversely, the number served was as low as fifteen percent. 
[5]  
According to the World Bank, “in order to achieve a centralized wastewater treatment rate of 60 
percent, it is estimated that a total investment of around 14 million RMB (2.05 million USD based on an 
exchange rate of 6.8249 RMB to 1 USD) will be required between 2003 and 2010. Investments of 5.6, 7.6, 
and .65 million RMB (.82, 1.11, .095 million USD) are required for wastewater treatment plants, sewer 
networks, and sludge handling facilities respectively.” [5] Financially, that 14 million RMB (2.05 million 
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USD) represents a yearly investment of 1.75 million RMB (.256 million USD), an amount that 
corresponds to approximately .005% of China’s GDP (based on a 2009 GDP of $4.758 trillion and a 2009 
exchange rate of 6.8249 RMB per dollar[2]).  Though China has the funds to easily meet the necessary 
monetary investment, the time necessary to construct quality infrastructure represents a great obstacle 
to serving sixty percent of the country through centralized treatment in the near future.  
In its 2006 study of water issues in China, the World Bank reported that China’s 9th Five-Year Plan, which 
was in effect from 1995-2000, required fifty-two wastewater treatment plants to be built in the Huai 
River basin, one of the most polluted parts of (Northern) China.[5] However, only thirty plants were 
complete or under construction by the time the report was released,[5] over five years after the 
conclusion of the 9th Five-Year Plan. Furthermore, “progress…has been much slower than planned, and 
established units cannot run at full capacity due to a lack of complementary sewer networks.” [5] This 
delay in establishing necessary water and wastewater treatment infrastructure is reflected in a World 
Bank case study of Lake Dian, a large shallow lake in Yunnan Province that suffered from severe 
pollution, resulting in high levels of eutrophication.[5] According to the World Bank, sixty five treatment 
plants were completed in the area during the 9th Five-Year Plan, including four large wastewater 
treatment facilities with a combined capacity of 365000 tons per day.[5] However, inadequate 
investments in the collection system have resulted in collection rates around 33 percent.[5] Consequently, 
even though a large number of treatment facilities were constructed, many of them are either closed or 
only partially operational.[5] Additionally, the lack of an expansion of the collection system has prevented 
many other previously planned projects (12 projects, 1.29 billion RMB,[5] .189 billion USD) from being 
completed prior to the end of the 9th Five-Year plan, resulting in unmet water quality goals. [5]  
Pollution control projects have shared a similar fate;[5] though “a major feature of the 10th Five-Year 
Plan,” [5] a majority (greater than fifty percent) of the projects were not completed within the five-year 
plan period.[5] This delay is partly due to the fact that the cost of extending collection and distribution 
systems into certain areas, such as older areas of a city or more rural areas can be prohibitively high.[5] 
The high cost of expanding centralized treatment into some areas coupled with both the large time 
investment and the pattern of delays in constructing treatment infrastructure necessitates the 
implementation of a temporary, yet possibly effective solution: distributed (point-of-use) treatment. 
Point-of-use treatment has been employed throughout the world where the construction of centralized 
treatment infrastructure has lagged behind the demand for clean water.[25] According to the United 
Nations (UN) Millennium Project Task Force on Water and Sanitation, the improvements in water quality 
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that would come with the implementation of a point-of-use water treatment program “would decrease 
diarrheal episodes by 45 percent.” [25] While a variety of methods exist, each has been proven to reduce 
or eliminate a variety of contaminants in field studies throughout the developing world. Solar 
disinfection (SODIS) was shown to reduce the incidence of diarrhea in children under the age of five by 
16-24%[30] and a reduction in cholera cases of 86%[30] among the Maasai people.[30] In Bolivia, the use of 
SODIS reduced the incidence of diarrhea in children under five years old by more than 35%;[30] in Tamil 
Nadu, the risk of diarrhea for similar subjects who utilized SODIS was reduced by 40%.[30] Similar results 
have been reproduced for a number of other field studies by the same research group. [30] Potters for 
Peace, an international NGO teaches local craftspeople the art of making silver-impregnated filter pots. 
[31] These water filters, which have also been used in many nations worldwide, have been shown to 
deactivate bacteria present in drinking water. [32
 
] Figure 4 below shows the prevalence of solar 
disinfection (SODIS) users through the globe.[30]  
 
Figure 4: Geographical Distribution of Solar Disinfection (SODIS) Users Worldwide [30] 
 
 
Though Figure 4 demonstrates the prevalence of solar disinfection (SODIS) use throughout the 
developing world,[30] it is important to note the locations that are not currently utilizing this treatment 
method, specifically China. Even though parts of China have the ideal climate for water treatment by 
SODIS,[30]  that method is not currently being implemented anywhere in China according to the Figure. 
Other point-of-use water treatment methods have met a similar fate;[33][34
                                                          
30 Meierhofer, R. and Landolt, G. “Factors Supporting the Sustained use of Solar Water Disinfection-  
] while readily accepted 
throughout the world,[30][31][32] China remains an essentially closed market. Two case studies, one from 
Experiences from a Global Promotion and Dissemination Programme.” Desalination, vol. 248, p. 144-151. 
Accepted 15 May 2008. 
31 Potters for Peace homepage. Accessed 16 April 2010. http://www.pottersforpeace.org/. 
32Oyandel-Craver, Vinka A. and Smith, James A. “Sustainable Colloidal-Silver-Impregnated Ceramic  
Filter for Point-of-Use Water Treatment.” Environmental Science and Technology, vol. 42, p. 927-933. 
Accepted 12 November 2007. 
33Gately, Michael via O’Callaghan, Kevin. E-mail correspondence. 18, 19 October 2009. 
34 Zhang, Jack. Personal Interview. 2 November 2009. 
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Medentech,[33][35] a multinational firm headquartered in Ireland and one from PATH China,[34][36
 
] the 
branch office of a global NGO provide some possible insight into why the barriers to entry for point-of-
use water treatment are high in China. 
 
B. POINT OF USE WATER TREATMENT AND ITS BARRIERS TO ENTRY IN CHINA 
 
Medentech produces Aquatabs,[35] chlorination-based water purification tablets that have been 
employed in both disaster relief situations and as part of a regular treatment regiment where adequate 
infrastructure is not in place.[35] Having an interest in entering the untapped Chinese market, Medentech 
conducted a market assessment,[33] the conclusion of which were that it would not be profitable for 
Medentech to pursue sales of Aquatabs or any of its other products in China.[33] Medentech’s informal 
study of Chinese citizens determined that people expected the central government to provide safe 
water as a service[33] (Gately calls this expectation the “old Communist mentality” [33]). Additionally, 
people felt that they should not have to pay for clean water;[33] consequently, willingness to pay for 
point-of-use water treatment was low.[33] Finally, since boiling water is a common practice[33] (common 
to drink hot water or tea), people did not feel that there was a need to disinfect their drinking water.[33] 
PATH is a global Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) [36] that has implemented point-of-use water 
treatment projects (the Safe Water Project[36]) in developing countries including India;[36] however water 
treatment has not been on PATH China’s list of priorities.[34] No dedicated program office is currently 
working in that area (water treatment) in China according to Mr. Jack Zhang, head of the PATH China.[34] 
Though Zhang believes that there is probably a need for point-of-use water treatment in the countryside, 
[34] his team has not been able to discern whether there is a general need for that type of project in 
China.[34] Additionally, Zhang is unsure if they can get support from the government to develop a point-
of-use treatment program.[34] Furthermore, Zhang notes that one of the key factors of success in China is 
having the cooperation of state-owned companies and the local government;[34] it is very difficult to 
implement any program without the support of the Chinese government.[34] PATH has been in China 
since the early 1980s[34] and established an office in Beijing in 2003;[34] even with years of NGO 
experience in China, Mr. Zhang doesn’t see any opportunities or a need to work on water treatment.[34] 
                                                          
35 Medentech homepage. Accessed 2 April 2010. http://www.medentech.com. 
36PATH. “Quenching the Thirst for Safe Water: Using Market Forces to Fulfill a Universal Need.” Date  
Accessed: 2 April 2010. http://www.path.org/projects/safe_water.php. 
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It would seem that both a lack of a very visible public need[24][26] (see Section II.B.) and lack of 
government support[34][ combine to create the largest barriers to entry for the development of point-of-
use water treatment, especially in the rural (and poorer) areas where the need is greatest and 
investment is typically minimal.[5][7] 
An additional barrier to entry of distributed treatment arises due to the fact that mechanisms for private 
investment are not in place.[5] Mainly, there is a lack of an adequate system in place for loan repayment. 
Consequently, the government remains as the main source of funding and contribution from other 
sources is minimal. [5] This issue thus reinforces the previous conjecture that a project will not be 
successful without (financial) support from the government.[34] Furthermore, as is the case with the 
agricultural sector, there is little incentive for individuals to invest in point-of-use water (and 
wastewater) treatment due to the low price of water and sewage treatment and distribution.[4] Raising 
the price of treatment and distribution to more accurately reflect the costs of providing those services 
(and the environmental and health consequences that result from a lack of treatment) will not only raise 
funds to expand infrastructure, but provide the impetus for individuals to use water more efficiently. 
Further implementation of education programs to demonstrate the importance of drinking treated 
water[5] will help foster an increased demand for water treatment including temporary (point-of-use) 
solutions where construction of centralized infrastructure has not yet been completed. 
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V. GENERAL CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
 
Though some hurdles –political, social, and environmental- must be overcome, China’s water crisis can 
be averted if the government makes adjustments (in some cases, more drastic adjustments) both 
structurally and policy-wise. A tabular breakdown of recommendations by category is detailed in Table 8 
(next page). 
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Table 8: Recommendations for Successful and Sustainable Implementation of Water Quantity and 
Quality Solutions 
Structural 
Recommendations 
• Consolidate the organizations that oversee water pollution control and clearly define the mandate of those organizations.[5] 
• Employ greater policing to see that regulations are followed 
corruption-free.[3] 
• Increase the power of the MEP with respect to other cabinet 
ministries and include EIA and other related subjects in the 
training and promotion criteria of party cadres.[7][11] 
Law-Based Policy 
Recommendations 
• Revise the Water Law to allow for individual ownership of 
water rights and establish market-based pricing of water 
that reflects its’ actual value.[5] 
• Establish (economic) incentives to encourage water saving 
and counter the (economic and political) incentives that can 
result if regulations are ignored.[5] 
• Develop mechanisms into place to protect and foster private 
investment.[5][7] 
Citizen- Focused Policy 
Recommendations 
• Give a higher priority to environmental protection (and 
following regulations) in future policies and remove 
enforced targets that monitor economic growth solely in 
percentages.[5] 
• Further develop rainwater harvesting programs that include 
education of farmers on more responsible water use. 
• Emphasize the importance of environmental protection and 
the health consequences of consuming water of poor quality 
through education.[5] 
• Encourage the adoption of water saving irrigation 
equipment through subsidies and education programs.[28][29] 
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China has developed and modernized at a pace unmatched by any other nation to attain an economy 
that is the third-largest[2] and a population that is largest[2] in the world, respectively. If the Chinese 
government can reinforce in deed their rhetoric that environmental protection and pollution reduction 
are high priorities,[4][5] and open themselves to more foreign investment and influence,[18][19][20] then 
China will be able to remedy the environmental issues it currently faces with the help of the 
international community. The one certainty is that the world will continue to be fixed on China is it 
pursues its unique path of development into a First World nation that could quite possible surpass the 
United States in a only a short span of time. 
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